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Objective: We conducted a meta-analysis to examine whether numeric decision-making in law is sus-
ceptible to the effect of (possibly arbitrary) values present in the decision contexts (anchoring effect)
and to investigate which factors might moderate this effect. Hypotheses: We predicted that the presence
of numeric anchors would bias legal decision-makers’ judgment in the direction of the anchor value.
We hypothesized that the effect size of anchoring would be moderated by several variables, which we
grouped into three categories: methodological (type of stimuli; type of sample), psychological (standard
vs. basic paradigm; anchor value; type of scale on which the participants assessed the target value), and
legal (relevance of the anchor; type of the anchor; area of law to which the presented case belonged;
presence of any salient numeric values other than the main anchor). Method: Twenty-nine studies (93
effect sizes; N = 8,549) met the inclusion criteria. We divided them into two groups, depending on
whether they included a control group, and calculated the overall effect size using a random-effects
Model with robust variance estimation. We assessed the influence of moderators using random effects
metaregression. Results: The overall effect sizes of anchoring for studies with a control group (z = .27,
95% CI [.21, .33], d = .58, 95% CI [.44, .73]) and without a control group (z = .39, 95% CI [.31, .47],
d = .91, 95% CI [.69, 1.12]) were both significant, although we provide some evidence of possible pub-
lication bias. We found preliminary evidence of a potential moderating effect of some legally relevant
factors, such as legal expertise or the anchor relevance. Conclusions: Existing research indicates
anchoring effects exist in legal contexts. The influence of anchors seems to depend on some situa-
tional factors, which paves the way for future research on countering the problematic effect in legal
settings.
Public Significance Statement
Our review corroborates the thesis that numeric decisions in law (such as damages or prison terms)
are susceptible to the effect of salient numbers present in the decision context. Such anchoring
effects might have undesirable consequences, possibly making court rulings biased or erratic. Our
results, however, suggest that the effect might be moderated by a number of factors, which might be
used by lawmakers to limit the influence of undesirable anchors or by attorneys to calibrate their
demands.
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Theoretical models for the process of generating numerical legal
decisions (e.g., the amount of damages or the length of prison
term) suggest that this process is typically distorted by salient but
not necessarily relevant numerical values present in the decision
contexts—also known as anchors (Hans & Reyna, 2011; Hastie,
2011; Kahneman et al., 1998). Indeed, the experimental research
conducted over the last 30 years seems to clearly indicate that
legal decision-makers anchor on salient (but possibly arbitrary)
numbers present in the decision environment when rendering nu-
merical decisions in a variety of legal cases. This points to the risk
that numerical verdicts are not issued in a predictable and unbiased
way, which in turn may lead to a number of socially undesirable
consequences (Hastie, 2011; Hastie et al., 1999; Helm et al.,
2017). First, if judges and jurors render different numerical ver-
dicts for similar cases, this is obviously unfair and may also under-
mine the social legitimacy of the legal system. Second, if such
inconsistencies increase the variability of rulings (meaning the
greater unpredictability of law), it makes legal actors overspend on
the management of legal risk and may also decrease the rate of set-
tlement out of court. Finally, if decision-makers’ biases are more
systematic (simply making the expected sanction too harsh or too
lenient), then the result may be the regular overdeterrence of be-
nign activities, or the opposite: the underdeterrence of actions that
are actually wrongful.
A court ruling should be treated as a decision with serious conse-
quences at both the individual and societal levels. Therefore, it is cru-
cial that these decisions are made accurately and reliably. In the spirit
of Messick’s measurement theory (Messick, 1989; Shepard, 1993),
which is widely used in psychological and educational research, we
consider court verdicts as high-stakes assessment (results lead to
major/significant consequences), which should demonstrate conse-
quential validity. It is crucial to investigate to what extent the deci-
sion-making process in courts is prone to the influence of factors
potentially irrelevant to the case—such as those impacting it through
the operation of the anchoring effect.
Experimental research on anchoring in legal decision-making
has reached exactly the stage that justifies conducting a systematic
research synthesis: On one hand, the number of studies is large
enough to allow for some valid meta-analytic inferences, whereas
on the other, it is not yet the case that any such inferences are
obvious. Even more importantly, the existing literature clearly
points to some controversies with regard to which available studies
give inconclusive or contradictory answers. From a psychological
perspective, for example, it is of major theoretical interest whether
asking the legal decision-maker a comparative question (Is the tar-
get value more or less than the anchor?) before the absolute ques-
tion increases the effect of anchoring (so-called standard vs. basic
anchoring dispute; Englich, 2006). There are also many crucial
questions from a legal perspective: For example, do anchors that
are legally irrelevant (or even inadmissible) result in smaller
effects than those legally important (Glöckner & Englich, 2015;
Wistrich et al., 2005)? Can the influence of the most salient num-
ber be effectively mitigated by introducing another anchor in the
context (Marti & Wissler, 2000)? Such questions carry great im-
portance for both psychology and law. If legal professionals are
less susceptible to the anchoring effect than laypeople (Englich &
Soder, 2009; see also Northcraft & Neale, 1987), such a pattern
would be interesting both for the general psychology of expert
judgment and for the very practical legal question of relative
(dis)advantages of a jury system.
These questions are but examples of issues to which the existing
experimental research on legal anchoring has given inconsistent
answers. To the extent that the present analysis brings us closer to
clarifying such issues, it not only makes a substantial contribution
to psychology and legal theory but also may be of interest to legal
practitioners. For instance, defense attorneys may be interested
whether setting another anchor (countering an initial claim) is an
effective strategy, and adjudicators may learn about the relative
effect of different anchors.
The Psychology of the Anchoring Effect
The anchoring effect refers to a situation in which a decision-
maker, having been asked to estimate a certain numerical value,
tends to ground that value on the first (and/or salient) numerical
value they encounter (Orr & Guthrie, 2006). Since the seminal
work by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), the anchoring effect has
been found to influence numerical estimation tasks in a number of
domains, such as negotiations, estimates of product prices, self-
efficacy, forecasting, and various general knowledge questions
(for a comprehensive review, see Furnham & Boo, 2011).
There are two older psychological models of anchoring. The
insufficient adjustment model (Epley & Gilovich, 2005; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974) postulates that the decision-maker, being aware
that a given anchor might not be an accurate estimate of the target
value, tries to adjust the anchor value accordingly but fails to do it
to a sufficient degree, thus biasing the final answer. The numeric
priming model (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Wilson et al., 1996;
Wong & Kwong, 2000) states that the presence of an anchor
makes the value suggested by it more mentally accessible, so that
it is likely to influence the assessment of the target value. These
two models enjoy limited popularity nowadays, as they are seen as
narrow in scope and failing to satisfactorily explain many experi-
mental results (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Epley & Gilovich,
2005; Mochon & Frederick, 2013; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999a).
There are, however, at least two other competing models favored
by contemporary scholars.
The selective accessibility model (Chapman & Johnson, 1994,
1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b) sees the process of anchoring as
consisting of two phases: First, the decision-maker assumes that a tar-
get value might be equal to the anchor and accesses as much knowl-
edge supporting this claim as they can. If this makes the decision-
maker falsify the assumption that the target value is equal to the
anchor, they will move to the second phase where they assess another
possible answer. This, however, happens after knowledge consistent
with the anchor has been accessed in the first phase (confirmatory hy-
pothesis testing; Furnham & Boo, 2011; Strack & Mussweiler,
1997), which influences where the decision-maker looks for alterna-
tive answers in the second phase (semantic priming; Chapman &
Johnson, 1999; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). This view on anchoring
finds some empirical support (Furnham & Boo, 2011). Based on the
selective accessibility model, Wegener and colleagues (2010b) pro-
posed the elaboration-based account, in which they argue that kinds
of elaboration other than selective accessibility may also be useful in
explaining anchoring. This account relies heavily on the attitude
change research (Petty & Wegener, 1998, 1999) that makes use of
persuasion variables (such as the emotions and credibility of the




















































































































person delivering a message) and two different levels of elaboration
(thoughtful vs. nonthoughtful) when explaining the decision making
process. This relates directly to the shift in the participant’s attitude
toward the targeted response (Wegener et al., 2010a, 2010b): Mes-
sage recipients, while not thinking carefully about the message, might
develop a favorable attitude toward certain decisions based on their
mood or the credibility ascribed to the person delivering the
message.
It is worth noting that the two phenomena used in the selective
accessibility model occur at the deep level of cognition. In con-
trast, in the scale distortion theory (Frederick & Mochon, 2012)
anchoring occurs at the shallow level of cognition, as a result of a
distortion in the mapping of judgments to the provided response
scale (Frederick & Mochon, 2012; Mochon & Frederick, 2013). In
this model, unlike in the selective accessibility model, numeric
anchors do not change the participant’s beliefs or representations
but simply influence the response scale. The proponents of this
model provide a significant number of experiments showing that
the process of anchoring seems not to have any effect on the
beliefs of the anchored participants and that anchors affect the
mapping from stimuli to numbers (Frederick & Mochon, 2012;
Mochon & Frederick, 2013).
The selective accessibility model and scale distortion theory
might be perceived as competing. The latter offers some evidence
suggesting that confirmatory hypothesis testing does not always
occur in the anchoring context. On the other hand, the mechanism
of hypothesis testing is well established within the general psycho-
logical literature (Mussweiler, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 1996),
and its ability to explain some cases of anchoring was demon-
strated in empirical studies (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). The
available evidence does not favor either of the two models, and
one might speculate that each theory offers an explanation of just
some aspects of anchoring.
Anchoring andModels of Numerical Verdicts in Law
The anchoring effect is central to all proposed theoretical
models that aim at explaining how legal decision-makers deter-
mine numerical verdicts. Three such theoretical models have
been proposed in the literature to account for the jury damage
award (although they can be generalized to the judicial con-
text). The first one, the shared outrage model, proposed by
Kahneman and colleagues (1998), explicitly aims at accounting
for the production of numerical verdicts in a very specific con-
text of punitive damages in tort cases. The model posits that lay
jurors, while assessing the defendant’s behavior, form a sense
of outrage that, combined with the ensuing harm, determines
their punitive intent. Finally, they map their punitive intent on
an (unbound) dollar scale of punitive damages. Whereas the
results of the first two stages (outrageousness and punitive
intent) are quite consistent across individuals, the eventual
monetary punitive damages are much more capricious and
prone to be influenced by various anchors present in the
context.
The Intention þ Anchor model, proposed by Hastie (2011), was
conceived as a generalization of the shared outrage model.
According to this model, a legal decision-maker first assesses
pieces of information present in the proceedings (such as evidence,
argumentation, behavior of the parties, etc.) along with the
background knowledge and other factors (e.g., instructions for the
jury) and then forms a general intention to compensate or punish.
There could be various interpretations of this process, including,
for example, the construction of a plausible narrative (Pennington
& Hastie, 1991); intuitive reactions to some specific elements
(Saks & Kidd, 1980); or other types of information processing
(Schum & Martin, 1982; Thomas & Hogue, 1976; Weld & Dan-
zig, 1940). Then, an anchor is identified or (very rarely) generated.
Finally, the anchor is adjusted in compliance with legally relevant
guidance (such as mitigating/aggravating factors or jury instruc-
tions). However, the law rarely offers definitive guidance on ren-
dering numerical verdicts. Thus, the process of adjustment is often
strongly influenced by two psychological effects. First, there
occurs a serial underadjustment (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2005),
in which sequentially assessed pieces of information that lower or
raise the target value are dominated by the presence of an anchor
value, which weakens the impact of the information. Second, the
anchor biases information sampling: items congruent to the anchor
are easier to recall (Mussweiler, 2003).
The last model to be presented here, proposed by Hans and
Reyna (2011) draws from research on the fuzzy-trace theory
(Reyna, 2012; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). The central point of this
theory is that people encode the information as either verbatim (lit-
eral, detailed, veridical) or as gist representations (essential mean-
ing). The main assumption of the proposed model is that jurors
engage in gist-based reasoning while deciding on the amount of
damages (Reyna et al., 2015). The first stage consists of a categori-
cal gist judgment, in which the decision-maker decides whether
damages are warranted. In the second stage, the ordinal gist judg-
ment is made, ranking the damages as high, medium, or low.
Based on that, the decision-maker proceeds to the stage of generat-
ing numbers that fit the gist magnitude. The exact values are influ-
enced by a multitude of factors, such as anchors present in the
context (especially if they are relevant) and symbolic numbers
from juror’s everyday life that have low or high meaning attached
to them (Hans et al., 2018; see Hans & Reyna, 2011; Reyna et al.,
2015).
Overview of the Research
The research on the susceptibility of legal decision-makers to
the anchoring effect started with experimental studies on civil pro-
ceedings, particularly on the influence of the numbers presented
by the parties to a civil dispute on the amount of awarded dam-
ages. Considerable experimental evidence suggests that there is a
strong dependency of the awarded amount on the initial amount
claimed by the plaintiff (ad damnum in the Anglo-American legal
terminology), which means that the higher the plaintiff’s demand,
the higher the damages awarded, even if the evidence presented by
the plaintiff remains the same (Broeder, 1959; Hastie et al., 1999;
Malouff & Schutte, 1989; Zuehl, 1982). It may be argued that ad
damnum is not a fully irrelevant anchor, since it may convey some
information about the severity of harm suffered by the plaintiff, so
that legal decision-makers are rational in assimilating their judg-
ments to this value. However, some studies (Chapman & Born-
stein, 1996) suggested that increasing ad damnum increases the
amount of damages without changing the perception of the sever-
ity of harm suffered by the plaintiff. On the other hand, some
authors (Malouff & Schutte, 1989; Marti & Wissler, 2000) have




















































































































argued that there exists a boomerang effect: If the plaintiff
demands an amount that is absurdly high, it decreases their credi-
bility, leading to effectively lower damages. In this context, the
anchor produces contrast instead of assimilation. Nonetheless,
other studies (Campbell et al., 2016; Chapman & Bornstein, 1996)
have shown that participants assimilate their judgments even to an
extremely high amount of ad damnum, meaning that the assimila-
tion to the anchor in this context is very robust.
Ad damnum is not the only possible anchor that has been studied
in the context of civil proceedings. Other values that have been
shown to serve as anchors in this context are statutory caps on the
amount of noneconomic or punitive damages (Hinsz & Indahl,
1995; Rachlinski et al., 2015; Robbennolt & Studebaker, 1999;
Saks et al., 1997); a value appearing in the opinion of an expert wit-
ness (Greene et al., 1999; Raitz et al., 1990); a value appearing in
an inadmissible piece of evidence (Wistrich et al., 2005); an amount
of damages awarded in a similar case on a TV court show (Guthrie
et al., 2009; Rachlinski et al., 2015); or even a value appearing in a
meritless objection raised by the defendant (Guthrie et al., 2000).
In contrast, relatively little research has been conducted on the
role of anchoring in criminal proceedings. One notable exception
is a series of studies by Englich and colleagues (Englich, 2005;
2006; Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; Englich & Soder, 2009),
which found that participants (including professional judges)
decided on the length of prison terms under the influence of
anchors, such as the prison term demanded by the public prosecu-
tor, suggested by a journalist or even by a random IT student.
What is more, participants tended to assimilate their verdicts to the
demand of the prosecutor even when they were fully aware that
this value had been generated randomly.
Moreover, experimental studies seem to be corroborated by a
respectable number of observational studies in this area (Broeder,
1959; Chang et al., 2016; Diamond et al., 2011; Fariña et al.,
2003; Kim & Chae, 2017; Martin & Alonso, 1997) that provide
further support for the existence of anchoring in real-life rulings.
Despite the abundance of experimental research on the anchor-
ing effect, no meta-analysis on this topic has been published in the
general psychological literature (see Furnham & Boo, 2011 for a
literature review). The same can be said about anchoring in legal
decision-making: No meta-analysis has been published to date,
and the only existing literature review (Englich, 2006) does not
include a substantive portion of studies published in recent years.
The existing analysis closest to the present study is the meta-
analysis on the anchoring effect in negotiations (Orr & Guthrie,
2006). The authors established that the average size of the effect
of anchors on the outcome of simulated negotiations reported in
the literature is surprisingly large (r = .5). They also assessed the
effects of two moderator variables similar to the ones to be ana-
lyzed here: experience of participants and presence of numeric val-
ues other than the main anchor in the decision context. In both
cases, the average effect size was smaller for the professional nego-
tiators and in contexts in which other numeric values were present,
although these results did not reach statistical significance.
The Present Research
Usually, the main aim of the meta-analysis is to synthesize the
results of the several studies into a single estimate, that is, a sum-
mary effect size (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). However, in the
case of anchoring, we had to split this task into two. This stems
from the fact that some studies included in this analysis followed
the regular paradigm in psychological research of comparing inter-
vention and control groups (i.e., a group exposed to some anchor
and a group that did not see any anchor), whereas other studies did
not use a control group, merely comparing groups exposed to
anchors of different values. Although the employment of a control
group is a traditional practice in experimental research (Hinkelmann
& Kempthorne, 2008), Englich and colleagues (2006) argued that
using two different anchors rather than contrasting the anchored
group to the control group is justified by a few reasons: first, to
eliminate accidental or self-imposed anchors; second, to eliminate
the effect of the presence of mere initial judgment in one of the
groups (in the standard paradigm design); and third, to focus on the
absolute effect of anchoring rather than determining which anchors
produce the stronger effect. To account for this methodological
divergence, we conducted all analyses separately for these two
groups of studies, to examine whether the effect exists under both
types of design and, if so, what its relative strength is under each.
Following the authors who have claimed that participants in a con-
trol group employ other, possibly self-generated anchors (resulting
in a higher variance of target assessments), we predicted that the
overall effect size is lower for studies employing a control group.
Hypothesis 1: The introduction of a numeric anchor will bias
legal decision-makers’ judgment in the direction of the anchor
value (anchoring effect). The observed effect size of anchoring
will be smaller in studies comparing an intervention group (i.e.,
a group exposed to an anchor) with a control group than in stud-
ies comparing groups exposed to anchors of different values
(without a control group).
The second objective of this research synthesis was to examine
to what extent the overall effect sizes are prone to the influence of
a number of moderators. We proposed the moderator selection
guided by three perspectives of research, which are often intercon-
nected. The first one, the methodological perspective, deals with
study characteristics that have a general potential to influence the
effect size, such as the size of the employed sample or the publica-
tion status of a given study. The second—psychological—perspec-
tive, focuses on the cognitive aspect of the phenomenon to
determine which circumstances may lead to stronger anchoring
effects. This includes such study characteristics as the employed
paradigm of studying anchoring (basic vs. standard) or the type of
scale on which the target value was assessed (bound or unbound).
Finally, the third perspective—the legal one—refers to properties
especially relevant from the viewpoint of the legal process. This
group of variables includes, for example, the legal relevance of the
anchor or the branch of law to which the employed case refers.
Our final research question was whether or not overall effect
sizes are overestimated as a result of publication bias, that is, a
lower chance of publishing studies that report smaller, insignifi-
cant results (Joober et al., 2012). We addressed this issue by the
trim-and-fill method supplemented by Egger’s Test to indicate
whether the calculated overall effect sizes should be considered as
overestimated (to account for possibly missing studies). We also
derived some relevant results from a metaregression analysis (pub-
lished vs. unpublished condition subgroup analysis).





















































































































Methodological Characteristics of Primary Research
We introduced four moderators to reflect methodological char-
acteristics of primary research: publication status, sample size, the
type of employed stimuli, and the type of employed sample. The
reason behind the inclusion of the first two of these variables was
to examine the possibility of publication bias. If studies reporting
statistically significant results were indeed more likely to be pub-
lished, then we might expect that the overall effect size for published
studies would be larger than for those that were not published.
Moreover, a negative dependence between sample sizes and effect
sizes might also be an indication of publication bias (assuming that,
in the case of studies employing small samples and reporting small
effect sizes, it is more likely that such effects would be statistically
insignificant; Levine et al., 2009). We introduced the moderator
sample size measured on a continuous scale.
In all the analyzed studies, the participants were presented with
a stimuli in the form of some representation of a legal case to be
decided. In most studies, this representation consisted of a written
description of a case. Two general approaches are possible while
constructing textual stimuli: First, a textual stimulus can be as
short as possible in order to help to isolate the operation of the
studied effect (Kerr & Bray, 2005), decrease the number of poten-
tial confounders, and avoid burdening the participants’ informa-
tion processing (Bieneck, 2009). On the other hand, written
stimuli that are too short (possibly oversimplifying the representa-
tion of the actual decision context) might lack ecological validity
(Bieneck, 2009). In the particular context of anchoring, this might
mean that the anchor present in a short vignette is more salient
(possibly also through demand characteristics; Nichols & Maner,
2008) than it would be in a real-life context (e.g., of court proceed-
ings), thus inflating its effect size. Such arguments led us to intro-
duce the following levels of the discussed moderator: short written
materials (i.e., a short summary of main details of the case) and
rich written materials (i.e., a more comprehensive presentation of
case details or a transcript, possibly approaching in length files
that a real-world judge would have to examine). Then, however,
anchoring studies can also employ nonwritten stimuli: a recording
of mock court proceedings. Arguably, such stimuli could increase
the ecological validity of a study, more closely resembling the
real-life context at least for some types of legal decision-makers,
such as lay jurors (Bornstein, 1999). The meta-analysis by Born-
stein et al. (2017) indicates that the mode of presentation (written
vs. other) influences the outcomes of a number of decision tasks in
jury simulation studies (cf. a study by Pezdek et al., 2010 regard-
ing the mode of presenting an expert opinion). For these reasons,
we introduced a third level of the discussed moderator: audio/
video recording. It seems that, in such a mode of presentation, the
anchor value may be even less salient, thus reducing the effect size
of anchoring.
Hypothesis 2: Exposing participants to short written stimuli
will result in a larger effect size of anchoring, compared to other
types of stimuli. Exposing participants to audio/video stimuli
will result in a smaller effect size of anchoring, compared to
other types of stimuli.
Most of the analyzed studies were conducted on mock jurors.
The question whether results obtained on lay samples are generaliz-
able to expert populations remains open to debate in cognitive psy-
chology, in general, and in research in anchoring, in particular (see
Northcraft & Neale, 1987). In empirical legal research, it is also
controversial whether legal expertise has a potential to immunize
decision-makers from the influence of undesirable psychological
effects (Teichman & Zamir, 2014; Tobia, 2020). There are many
possible reasons for professional legal decision-makers to be less
susceptible to anchoring than laypeople: professionals’ expertise
helps them ignore irrelevant information, their training in delibera-
tive reasoning helps them identify actually relevant factors, and
their knowledge of existing case law provides them with alternative
(and arguably relevant) anchors. Answering the question on the
effect of legal expertise bears importance not only for the issue of
generalizability of results obtained using a sample from a given
population but also for the very practical legal debate on the relative
advantages of a lay jury system (Bornstein & Greene, 2017). A
direct comparison of samples drawn from lay and professional pop-
ulations is rare in the research on legal anchoring. To address this
issue, we introduced a moderator type of sample with two levels:
lay and professional.
Hypothesis 3: The effect size of anchoring will be smaller
among legal professionals than among laypeople.
Psychological Variables
We included three moderators in the analysis to address contro-
versies present in the general literature on the anchoring effect:
paradigm (standard vs. basic); anchor value; type of scale on
which participants assessed the target value (closed vs. open).
There are two general paradigms employed in experimental
research on the anchoring effect. Under the standard paradigm, par-
ticipants are first asked a comparative question (whether the target
value is more or less than the provided anchor value) and only subse-
quently asked to give their estimate of the target value (Englich,
2008). In contrast, under the basic paradigm (Wilson et al., 1996)
participants are merely exposed to the anchor value and asked to give
their estimate of the target value without having to answer the com-
parative question first. These different approaches reflect a deeper
theoretical disagreement. Proponents of the selective accessibility
model assume that a comparative task is a crucial element of the
anchoring; thus, the anchoring effect is expected to lead to more ro-
bust results under the standard paradigm (Englich, 2008), whereas
the basic paradigm anchoring is triggered simply by numeric pri-
ming, which is a relatively shallow cognitive mechanism, resulting in
a smaller effect. Hence, if studies employing the standard paradigm
indeed lead to larger effect size, this would provide evidence useful
for choosing among different theoretical accounts of anchoring. This
moderator may also be of more direct legal relevance: if the standard
paradigm leads to more robust anchoring, it would imply that actual
legal decision-makers may anchor more strongly in those legal set-
tings in which they are expected to explicitly evaluate the anchor
value.
Hypothesis 4: The effect size of anchoring will be larger in
studies employing the standard paradigm than in studies
employing the basic paradigm.




















































































































The existing literature is rather unequivocal in its conviction
that the anchor value matters, as most of the time people will
assimilate their assessment of the target value to the value of the
anchor (see, e.g., Hinsz & Indahl, 1995). However, a major point
of controversy is whether this dependence is monotonic across the
board, that is, whether there will be assimilation to the anchor
even if the anchor is absurdly high (Chapman & Johnson, 1994;
Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Some scholars have suggested that
the strength of the anchor may be somewhat diminished in such
cases, as a value which lies outside some reasonable range loses
its credibility as a point of reference (Sugden et al., 2013; Wegener
et al., 2001). Earlier research went even further, suggesting a con-
trast effect; that is, instead of assimilating the target value to the
higher anchor, participants may turn in the opposite direction (see
Hinsz & Indahl, 1995; cf. Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). This con-
troversy is particularly important in the legal context because of,
among others, the question of whether the party starting the court
proceedings (plaintiff or prosecutor) can benefit from setting its
demand absurdly high. Some of the studies included in this meta-
analysis corroborate the thesis that the assessment of the target
value increases without a limit correspondingly to the increase in
the value of anchor (Campbell et al., 2016; Malouff & Schutte,
1989) even when the anchor is outlandishly high (Chapman &
Bornstein, 1996; Marti & Wissler, 2000). To account for the possi-
bility that the dependence between anchor value and the target
assessment might be nonlinear, we introduced three levels of the
moderator anchor value: low, medium, and high (based on standar-
dized z scores), although we validated our results by repeating the
analysis with the continuous moderator.
Hypothesis 5: Medium-valued anchors will result in a larger
effect size of anchoring than low- and high-valued anchors.
According to the scale distortion theory (Frederick & Mochon,
2012; Mochon & Frederick, 2013), the main impact of the anchor
is to change the response scale. The relation of the type of used
scale and the anchoring effect is also central to the shared outrage
model (Kahneman et al., 1998), which states that it is the difficulty
of translating a qualitative stimulus onto an unbound numeric scale
(such as the monetary scale) that allows anchors to play such an im-
portant role in legal decision-making. If those claims are correct,
we might expect that the anchoring effect is weaker in contexts in
which participants are asked to give their responses on a closed
scale (such as prison term within the statutorily defined scope or
damages not exceeding some specified caps) instead of on an
unbound scale (typically present in jury damage award), because it
is easier for participants to accurately map their attitudes on such a
scale, and the potential shift in scales is limited. Accordingly, we
introduced a moderator limit, which distinguished studies that pro-
vided participants with a closed scale from those that did not.
Hypothesis 6: The effect size of anchoring will be smaller in
studies in which the target value is assessed on a bound scale,
compared with studies employing an unbound scale.
Legal Moderators
Four moderators were included in the analysis to address con-
troversies typical of the research on anchoring in legal settings:
legal relevance of anchor; legal type of anchor (ad damnum,
damage cap, etc.); area of law to which the presented case
belonged (civil vs. criminal); and presence of any salient numeric
values other than the main anchor.
Some of the psychological models predict that relevant and irrel-
evant anchors can have a different impact on the target value assess-
ment. Whereas numeric priming predicts that the relevance of the
anchor does not have much impact, elaboration-based models sug-
gest that it is a key factor. When it comes to models of legal deci-
sion-making, the meaningfulness of an anchor may correspond
more adequately to the gist judgment of decision-makers, as
assumed by the Hans–Reyna model (Hans et al., 2018). This implies
that relevant anchors may have stronger effects (cf. Glöckner &
Englich, 2015). On the other hand, if irrelevant anchors can affect
the outcome of legal proceedings nonetheless, it might be an argu-
ment in favor of some institutional changes to limit the exposure of
legal decision-makers to such anchors. There are two dimensions of
relevance of an anchor to the estimation of the target value: the ma-
terial dimension (to what extent the anchor points to facts that are
actually relevant for assessing the target value, e.g., if it points to the
magnitude of harm suffered by the plaintiff) and the formal dimen-
sion (a given anchor might be explicitly inadmissible, or its inclu-
sion in assessing the target value might be legally required).
Because of the limited number of studies, we chose not to analyze
these two dimensions separately but rather to combine them into one
three-level measure.
The first level, irrelevant, includes anchor values that are not
directly related to the respective case and not informative with
regard to the target value (such as previous awards in unrelated
cases) and/or are legally inadmissible. Another aspect of the
(ir)relevance of the anchor is its meaningfulness, as described by
Hans et al. (2018). From the viewpoint of legal proceedings, some
anchors may be meaningful but still irrelevant. Such an example
would be the previous award in an unrelated case (Hans et al.,
2018; Reyna et al., 2015). Arguably, meaningless anchors may op-
erate differently than irrelevant but still meaningful ones. How-
ever, because of the small number of studies in each of these two
possible categories, we decided to merge them into one. The sec-
ond level, potentially relevant, refers to anchor values that are
given by parties to the dispute. They may be assumed to bear
some relevance to the target value, since a strategic party might be
expected not to give an outlandish value—but should nonetheless
be expected to be biased by the party’s interest in the proceedings.
The third level, relevant, denotes anchor values that are objec-
tively informative while assessing the target value and/or there is a
law that explicitly stipulates to take them into account when decid-
ing on the target value (e.g., previous awards in similar cases).
Hypothesis 7:Relevant anchors will result in a larger effect size
of anchoring and irrelevant anchors will result in a smaller
effect size of anchoring when compared with other levels of
anchor relevance.
As with relevance, elaboration-based theories could put an em-
phasis on the type of anchor unlike numeric priming and other
“shallow” models. Existing research on legal anchoring seems to
lend support to the first group of theories, as it suggests that the
anchor set by the party starting legal proceedings (ad damnum
demanded by the plaintiff or the penalty demanded by the prosecu-
tor) has a relatively strong effect on the target value assessment




















































































































(e.g., Hastie et al., 1999; Malouff & Schutte, 1989). In contrast, a
counteroffer issued by the defendant is assumed to perform rela-
tively poorly (Campbell et al., 2017; Decker, 2007). Legally bind-
ing caps on the damages amount is another type of anchor that
seems to result in strong anchoring (e.g., Hinsz & Indahl, 1995;
Saks et al., 1997). To corroborate these findings, we introduced
a moderator type of anchor with five levels: ad damnum; prose-
cutor’s demand; defendant’s counteroffer; damage caps; and the
final, residual category of other anchors.
Hypothesis 8: Anchors in the form of ad damnum, prosecutor’s
demand, or damage caps will result in larger effect sizes of
anchoring, when each of them is compared with anchors of all
other kinds. Anchors in the form of counteranchors will result
in a smaller effect size of anchoring, when compared with
anchors of other kinds.
Most of the existing research on judicial anchoring has been
conducted in the context of awarding damages in civil cases as
opposed to imposing punishment in criminal cases. There are
grounds to speculate that anchoring in criminal cases might result
in different effects: Apart from different goals in these two types
of proceedings, participants in “criminal” studies are asked to put
their responses on a closed scale (because the binding range of val-
ues in criminal sentences is generally explicitly provided by law)
and in temporal (the length of prison term) rather than monetary
terms. To explore this possibility, we introduced a moderator
branch of law with two levels: civil and criminal.
Hypothesis 9: Studies employing a criminal law context will
result in a smaller effect size of anchoring than studies employ-
ing a civil law context.
The existing research does not give a conclusive answer to the
question as to what extent the anchoring effect of the most salient
value present in the decision context can be limited by the pres-
ence of other numeric values. For example, although there is some
evidence that the defendant issuing a counteroffer might somewhat
limit the effect of the plaintiff’s ad damnum, the actual effective-
ness of such a counteranchor is contested, as mentioned above. It
also remains unclear whether presenting a number of other values
(such as the amount of damages awarded in similar previous
cases) can effectively diminish the effect of the main anchor (see
Hastie et al., 1999; Saks et al., 1997). To contribute to this discus-
sion, we introduce a moderator presence of other salient values
with three levels: mere anchor (just one salient value present),
counteranchor (one salient value other than main anchor is pres-
ent), and a larger number of salient values (relevant or irrelevant).
Hypothesis 10: The effect size resulting from the main anchor
will be smaller in studies employing a counteranchor or a larger
number of other salient values, when compared with other lev-
els of this moderator (see Table 1).
Method
This meta-analysis followed the Preferred Reporting Items for
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines
(Moher et al., 2009). We applied the PRISMA checklist and a flow
diagram demonstrating the four phases of conducting a meta-analy-
sis (identification, screening, eligibility, and included sources).
Literature Search and Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
Figure 1 provides an overview of the literature search and the
inclusion and exclusion criteria. The full list of excluded studies
appears in Appendix A.
Data Items
To deal with the aforementioned problem of two experimental
designs, we divided the calculated effect sizes into two catego-
ries: Control versus Anchor and High Anchor versus Low Anchor,
depending on the employed design. From studies having both a
control group and more than one anchor group, we extracted
effect sizes to be placed under both categories. For example, from
a study employing three groups (Control, Low Anchor, High
Anchor), we extracted two effect sizes (Low vs. Control and
High vs. Control) to be included in the first category and one
effect size (High vs. Low) to be included in the second one. Fur-
thermore, if a study compared n groups exposed to anchors of dif-
ferent values, we reported n – 1 effect sizes, each based on the
comparison of the lowest anchor group with one of the groups
with a higher anchor. Because of this procedure, when more than
two experimental groups were employed in the same study, we
used data obtained from participants belonging to the lowest
Table 1
Moderators and Levels
Moderator N of levels Level
Publication status 2 Unpublished, published
Sample size Continuous
Type of stimuli 3 Short written, rich written, audio/video
Type of sample 2 Lay, professional
Paradigm 2 Basic, standard
Anchor value 3 Low, medium, high
Anchor value Continuous
Type of scale 2 Open, closed
Relevance 3 Irrelevant, potentially relevant, relevant
Type of anchor 5 Ad damnum, damage cap, defendant’s counteroffer, prosecutor’s demand, other
Area of law 2 Civil, criminal
Other salient values 3 Mere anchor, counteranchor, larger number




















































































































anchor group or the control group to calculate more than one
effect size, thus, in a way, double-counting results obtained from
those participants. Thus, if a particular study had more than one
experimental intervention group with a common control group,
we decided to include both comparisons, taking into account the
possible correlation between them (dependent effect sizes).
Selecting only one comparison (and excluding others) would
have resulted in a loss of information and would have been open
to results-related choices, which is not generally recommended
(Higgins et al., 2019). To address the problem of double-counting
Figure 1
PRISMA Flow Diagram
Records after duplicates removed: (N = 80 published, 8 unpublished).
Inclusion criteria:
(1) Study had to involve an experimental manipulation of a salient numeric value present in the decision context.
(2) Study had to assess a numeric (monetary or time period) outcome of legal proceedings to be determined by
the subjects.
Studies assessed for eligibility: (N = 41).
Exclusion criteria:
Study design differences (N=3).
o Presence of an entire expert opinion 
as a manipulation (N=2).
o Awards variability as the dependent 
variable (N=1).
Missing data (N= 8).
Missing manuscript (N=1).
Studies included in meta-analysis:
Total (N=29).
o Control v. Anchor (N = 19).
o Low v. High Anchor (N=16).
Number of effects from studies (N = 93).
Control v. Anchor 
(N = 56).
Low v. High 
Anchor (N = 37).
Identification of sources
We searched Google Scholar, Westlaw, Scopus, JSTOR, HeinOnline, ProQuest, Ingenta, and 
PsycINFO using the following search terms: “anchoring AND judicial”, “anchoring AND judges,” 
“anchor effect AND judges,” “anchoring AND jury,” “heuristics AND judges”.
We examined references lists, such as bibliographies and footnotes, in a number of relevant identified 
articles and previous literature reviews.
We carried out searches in Internet repositories such as the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) 
and sent personalized emails with a call for unpublished papers to over 30 leading researchers in the 
field (response rate 28/32), as well as a general email through the mailing list of the Society for
Judgment and Decision Making (6 responses) to identify unpublished studies.
We concluded the search in 2019.
Note. PRISMA = Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses.




















































































































results, we employed weights based on sample size and, most
importantly, a more formal model taking into account the correla-
tion among dependent effects sizes (the robust variance estima-
tion approach) as described in the Summary Measures section.
Data Extraction
Three authors (PB, BJ, MP) simultaneously extracted and coded
the data. For most of the employed moderators, we were able to
unambiguously code the data on the basis of information explicitly
provided in the studies alone. To deal with those moderators that
required more complex assessment, we employed the following
criteria.
Type of Sample. The professional group included samples
consisting of law graduates: professional judges and attorneys, but
also experienced international arbitrators (Franck et al., 2017) and
judicial trainees (RechtsreferendarInnen; Englich, 2005). The lay
group included samples composed of individuals lacking legal
education (i.e., students from fields other than law, jury eligible
citizens, actual lay jurors, MTurk workers). Samples consisting of
law students do not easily qualify as samples of professionals or
laypeople and arguably should constitute a third level on its own.
This, however, was not feasible because of a small number of
studies employing such samples, so we decided to qualify them as
professional samples. This follows a more general trend in empiri-
cal legal research: Because law students have self-selected them-
selves to the legal profession and have already received some legal
training, they might be assumed to more closely resemble profes-
sionals (Tobia, 2020).
Area of Law. We classified the studies which related to the
settings of criminal proceedings (including military proceedings) and
required the participants to impose a punishment as “criminal law.”
Other cases, which focused on monetary damages, fell into the um-
brella category of “civil law,” which included not only torts and con-
tracts but also labor law (Guthrie et al., 2009; Study C.1), bankruptcy
law (Rachlinski et al., 2006), corporate law (Feldman et al., 2016;
Study 2), and international investment law (Franck et al., 2017).
Case Description. Whenever participants in the study were
told to watch/listen to recordings of a simulated court trial instead
of/in addition to written stimuli, we classified the stimuli as
“audio/video.” In the case of written stimuli, we set the cutoff line
between “short” and “rich” descriptions at 1,000 words.
Relevance. If a study introduced a value that was objec-
tively informative while assessing the target value, or the law ex-
plicitly stipulated taking it into account when deciding on the
target value (previous awards in similar cases, median income
while deciding on noneconomic damages, reliable expert opinion,
and damage caps), the study was coded as “relevant.” The second
category—“potentially relevant”—included numeric values given
by one of the parties to the proceedings (including expert opinions
solicited by one of the parties). The last category, “irrelevant,”
included values that were not directly related to the case and not
informative with regard to the target value. This included numbers
that were meaningful although irrelevant (previous awards in unre-
lated cases, damages awarded on a TV court show, prison term
suggested by a journalist, a heckler, or a student) or inadmissible
according to an explicit legal rule. In addition, in this category, we
included anchors that were meaningless (such as the cost of court-
room renovations).
Anchor Value. Taking into account that the studies gener-
ally included two distinctive types of anchor/target values (prison
terms expressed in units of time, and monetary values), we needed
to standardize the relative values within both types. We converted
the relative values of anchors—based on the difference between the
values of low and high anchors or the absolute value of the anchor
in the Control versus anchor category—into z scores. This meant
treating “no anchor” as “0 anchor,” which might seem to be prob-
lematic, because there may be an implicit, default mental “baseline”
(or just self-imposed anchor) for a selected question, differing
from 0. Moreover, any number accessible to participants could
have accidentally worked as an anchor (cf. Englich et al., 2006;
also consider the reasons behind the two differing methodologies
discussed above). We use the resulting z scores as a continuous
measure in subsequent analysis. However, to account for the
potential nonlinearity of the relation, we also divide the z score
values into three levels: high, medium, and low. We based this
division on the distribution of distance scores. The category
“low” contained scores up to the 25th percentile of the distribu-
tion, “medium” in the 26–74th percentiles, and “high” in the
75th percentile and above.
Final Dataset
We calculated a total of 93 effect sizes from 29 studies, divided
into the two groups: Control versus Anchor (56 effect sizes from
19 studies) and Low Anchor versus High Anchor (37 effect sizes
from 16 studies). The overall number of participants was 2,177
legal professionals (including 244 law students) and 6,372 laypeo-
ple. Publication dates ranged from 1989 to 2018. We concluded
the search in 2019.
Summary Measures
We used both Fisher’s z and Cohen’s d to calculate effect
sizes (see Tables 2 and 3). A few studies reported Mann–Whit-
ney test results, which we then recounted (we report all formu-
las used in the Appendix B). The calculation of effect sizes
based on nonparametric tests seemed preferable because of the
typical right-skewness of results of experimental studies on
anchoring. However, for studies for which we were able to cal-
culate effect sizes based on both the Mann–Whitney test and
the difference in means, the difference in obtained sizes was
not substantial.
To account for the skewed distribution of Pearson’s r reported
in the studies, we used Fisher’s z transformation, and we calcu-
lated the standard error of the distribution of the z statistic. What is
more, to obtain the standard error for the distribution of the r sta-
tistic, we used the formula provided by Everitt and Skrondal
(2002). To calculate Cohen’s d, we used the standard formula pro-
vided by Cohen (1988). To calculate the confidence interval (CI)
for this effect size, we used the general formula from Hedges and
Olkin (1984) and from it we calculated the 95% confidence inter-
val for Cohen’s d.
To address the issue of studies employing multiple interven-
tion groups, we used a method which takes into account the cor-
relation between effect sizes as recommended in the Cochrane
Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions (Higgins et
al., 2019), that is, the robust variance estimation (RVE; Hedges
et al., 2010). This approach allowed for handling statistically





















































































































Effect Sizes and Weights: Control Versus Anchor
Study Id_exp N
Effect Sizes
Weightz 95% CI Cohen’s d
Campbell et al. (2017) 1 188 .52 [.38, .67] 1.24 2.40
Campbell et al. (2017) 2 192 .13 [.01, .27] .26 2.41
Decker (2007)a 1a 142 .04 [.12, .21] .09 2.18
Decker (2007)b 1b 138 .05 [.12, .22] .11 2.16
Decker (2007)c 1c 143 .20 [.03, .36] .41 2.19
Diamond et al. (2000) 1a 43 .46 [.15, .77] 1.07 1.16
Diamond et al. (2000) 1b 43 .77 [.46, 1.08] 2.21 1.16
Diamond et al. (2000) 1c 47 .77 [.48, 1.07] 2.25 1.23
Diamond et al. (2000)d 1d 43 .57 [.26, .88] 1.42 1.16
Duke et al. (2015) 2 252 .14 [.01, .27] .29 2.59
Franck et al. (2017) 2a 104 .09 [.11, .29] .18 1.92
Franck et al. (2017) 2b 108 .09 [.10, .28] .18 1.96
Franck et al. (2017) 2c 104 .08 [.11, .28] .16 1.92
Glöckner and Englich (2015)e 1a 30 .32 [.05, .70] .69 .88
Glöckner and Englich (2015)f 1b 30 .31 [.07, .67] .66 .88
Glöckner and Englich (2015)g 1c 30 .26 [.12, .64] .54 .88
Glöckner and Englich (2015)h 2c 44 .23 [.08, .54] .48 1.18
Glöckner and Englich (2015)i 2d 44 .15 [.16, .45] .30 1.18
Glöckner and Englich (2015)j 2e 44 .19 [.11, .50] .40 1.18
Glöckner and Englich (2015)k 2f 44 .43 [.12, .74] .98 1.18
Guthrie et al. (2000) 1 116 .21 [.02, .39] .42 2.02
Guthrie et al. (2009) 1 82 .32 [.10, .54] .69 1.72
Hans et al. (2018)l 1a 63 .19 [.07, .44] .38 1.48
Hans et al. (2018)m 1b 62 .18 [.08, .43] .36 1.47
Hans et al. (2018)n 1c 62 .40 [.14, .66] .89 1.47
Hans et al. (2018)o 1d 63 .35 [.10, .60] .76 1.48
Hinsz and Indahl (1995) 1a 74 .45 [.21, .68] 1.02 1.63
Hinsz and Indahl (1995) 1b 75 .55 [.32, .78] 1.33 1.64
Hinsz and Indahl (1995) 3a 154 .35 [.20, .51] .77 2.25
Hinsz and Indahl (1995) 3b 100 .28 [.08, .48] .60 1.89
Hinsz and Matz (1997) 1 108 .30 [.10, .49] .63 1.96
McAuliff and Bornstein (2010) 1a 72 .38 [.14, .61] .83 1.60
McAuliff and Bornstein (2010) 1b 72 .04 [.20, .28] .08 1.60
McAuliff and Bornstein (2010) 1c 72 .28 [.04, .51] .58 1.60
McAuliff and Bornstein (2010) 1d 72 .31 [.08, .55] .67 1.60
Rachlinski et al. (2006) 1 103 .18 [.01, .38] .37 1.92
Rachlinski et al. (2015)p 1 112 .22 [.04, .41] .46 1.99
Rachlinski et al. (2015)q 2 58 .42 [.16, .67] .95 1.41
Rachlinski et al. (2015)r 4a 150 .16 [.00, .32] .33 2.23
Rachlinski et al. (2015)s 4b 149 .07 [.09, .23] .14 2.22
Reyna et al. (2015)t 1a 137 .38 [.21, .55] .83 2.15
Reyna et al. (2015)u 1b 137 .18 [.01, .35] .36 2.15
Reyna et al. (2015)v 1c 137 .30 [.13, .47] .64 2.15
Reyna et al. (2015)w 1d 137 .06 [.11, .23] .12 2.15
Robbennolt and Studebaker (1999) 1 124 .54 [.36, .71] 1.29 2.07
Robbennolt and Studebaker (1999) 2 349 .26 [.15, .36] .53 2.78
Schweizer (2005) 1a 110 .30 [.11, .49] .65 1.97
Schweizer (2005) 1b 107 .28 [.09, .47] .59 1.95
Stein and Drouin (2018)x 1a 118 .16 [.02, .34] .33 2.03
Stein and Drouin (2018)y 1b 122 .08 [.10, .26] .16 2.06
Stein and Drouin (2018)z 1c 117 .24 [.05, .42] .50 2.02
Stein and Drouin (2018)aa 1d 110 .08 [.11, .27] .17 1.97
Stein and Drouin (2018)ab 1e 118 .27 [.09, .46] .57 2.03
Stein and Drouin (2018)ac 1f 118 .16 [.02, .34] .32 2.03
Wistrich et al. (2005) 1a 100 .28 [.08, .48] .58 1.89
Wistrich et al. (2005) 1b 75 .39 [.16, .62] .86 1.64
Note. Id_exp refers to the number of a given study in the article in which it was reported. If there is no explicit numbering of studies in a given article, the first study
in the article to deal with anchoring is indicated as 1, and so on. Within the studies employing more than one anchor, we list effect sizes for anchors starting from low to
high. If the order of the anchors is different in the original article or we used one of the groups or conditions from the original article, this is indicated by the footnote.
a Control vs. 0 anchor. b Control vs. 80k anchor. c Control vs. 200k anchor. d Control vs. 500k cap. e Anchors from Irrelevant condition. f Anchors from
Relevant-prosecutor condition. g Anchors from Relevant-judge condition. h Irrelevant condition, high anchor. i Relevant condition, high anchor. j Irrelevant con-
dition, low anchor. k Relevant condition, low anchor. l Control vs. 1,500k anchor. m Control vs. 50k anchor. n Control vs. 1,500k anchor. o Control vs. 50k
anchor. p Canadian group from Study 2. q U.S. group from Study 2. r Control vs. Low anchor from Study 4. s Control vs. high anchor from Study 4.
t Meaningful condition, low anchor. u Meaningful condition, high anchor. v Meaningless condition, low anchor. w Meaningless condition, high anchor. x Ignore
condition. y Ignore condition. z Identify condition. aa Identify condition. ab Counter condition. ac Counter condition.




















































































































dependent effect sizes so that none of the effect sizes had to be
omitted when calculating the overall effect sizes. Moreover,
this method did not require information about the covariance
structure of the effect size estimates (Tanner-Smith & Tipton,
2014). In our model we chose random effects weights and assumed
within-study correlation between effect sizes, which is an average
correlation between all pairs of observed effect sizes within studies.
Then we ran metaregression models of interest, complemented by
small sample adjustments (Tipton, 2015), starting with estimation of
an unconditional mean effect size and testing whether it is significant.
Subsequently, we used a sensitivity analysis approach, focused on
reestimation using different values of correlation between 0 and 1 (ev-
ery .1), obtaining consistent results regardless of changing correlation
values. To validate obtained results, we used a classic meta-analytic pro-
cedure with additional weights, taking into account the problem of dou-
ble-counting the participants within each study. Within each of included
experiments, we calculated the weight for that comparison based on the
overall sample size used in all the comparisons.
Additionally, we used several methods to assess the risk of bias
across all the studies. We assessed the influence of moderators through
random effects metaregression and comparisons of subgroups assum-
ing robust variance estimators (Tanner-Smith & Tipton, 2014). The
study also investigated the publication bias using trim-and-fill (Duval
& Tweedie, 2000), which is recommended with observed larger
degrees of heterogeneity (Renkewitz & Keiner, 2019).
Results
Reported statistics include the number of studies (k), the
number of participants (N), weights, the effect sizes (z, d)
and 95% CIs, the significance test, and the heterogeneity
measure (i2). Because we assumed that the studies included
Table 3
Effect Sizes and Weights: High Versus Low Anchor
Study Id_exp N
Effect Sizes
Weightz 95% CI Cohen’s d
Campbell et al. (2016) 1 108 .65 [.46, .84] 1.71 3.33
Campbell et al. (2016) 2 100 .50 [.30, .70] 1.19 3.27
Chapman and Bornstein (1996) 1a 11 .52 [.18, 1.21] 1.23 .88
Chapman and Bornstein (1996) 1b 14 .71 [.12, 1.30] 1.94 1.12
Chapman and Bornstein (1996) 1c 14 .82 [.23, 1.41] 2.47 1.12
Diamond et al. (2000) 1a 46 .34 [.04, .64] .74 2.50
Diamond et al. (2000) 1b 50 .55 [.27, .84] 1.34 2.60
Englich (2005) 1a 90 .41 [.20, .62] .92 3.18
Englich (2005) 1b 84 .08 [.14, .30] .16 3.12
Englich and Mussweiler (2001) 1 19 .62 [.13, 1.11] 1.58 1.46
Englich and Mussweiler (2001) 2 44 .28 [.03, .59] .58 2.45
Englich and Mussweiler (2001) 3 16 .41 [.13, .96] .92 1.27
Englich et al. (2005) 1 42 .52 [.21, .84] 1.25 2.40
Englich et al. (2005) 2 42 .46 [.15, .77] 1.06 2.40
Englich et al. (2006) 1 42 .38 [.06, .69] .83 2.40
Englich et al. (2006) 2 39 .33 [.01, .66] .71 2.31
Englich et al. (2006) 3 52 .37 [.08, .65] .80 2.64
Feldman et al. (2016) 2 57 .40 [.13, .67] .89 2.74
Franck et al. (2017) 1 98 .66 [.46, .86] 1.75 3.26
Franck et al. (2017) 2a 114 .02 [.17, .20] .03 3.38
Franck et al. (2017) 2b 110 .17 [.02, .36] .36 3.35
Glöckner and Englich (2015)a 2c 44 .34 [.04, .65] .74 2.45
Glöckner and Englich (2015)b 2d 44 .60 [.29, .90] 1.49 2.45
Hastie et al. (1999) 1 173 .33 [.18, .48] .71 3.66
Hinsz and Indahl (1995) 2 120 .19 [.01, .37] .39 3.41
Malouff and Schutte (1989) 1aa 78 .62 [.39, .85] 1.58 3.05
Malouff and Schutte (1989) 1ab 77 .56 [.34, .79] 1.38 3.04
Malouff and Schutte (1989) 1ac 78 .83 [.60, 1.06] 2.53 3.05
Malouff and Schutte (1989) 1ba 80 .73 [.50, .95] 2.01 3.08
Malouff and Schutte (1989) 1bb 78 .63 [.41, .86] 1.63 3.05
Malouff and Schutte (1989) 1bc 80 .46 [.24, .69] 1.06 3.08
Patel (2013) 1 100 .29 [.09, .49] .61 3.27
Reyna et al. (2015)c 1a 44 .42 [.11, .72] .93 2.45
Reyna et al. (2015)d 1c 44 .26 [.05, .56] .54 2.45
Stein and Drouin (2018)e 1a 122 .12 [.06, .30] .25 3.43
Stein and Drouin (2018)f 1c 126 .10 [.07, .28] .21 3.45
Stein and Drouin (2018)g 1e 118 .35 [.17, .53] .76 3.40
Note. Id_exp refers to the number of a given study in the article in which it was reported. If there is no explicit numbering of studies in a given article,
the first study in the article to deal with anchoring is indicated as 1, and so on. Within the studies employing more than one anchor, we list effect sizes for
anchors starting from low to high. If the order of the anchors is different in the original article or we used one of the groups or conditions from the original
article, this is indicated by the footnote.
a Irrelevant condition. b Relevant condition. c Meaningful condition, low vs. high anchor. d Meaningless condition, low vs. high anchor. e Ignore
condition. f Identify condition. g Counter condition.




















































































































might have come from different populations, we calculated the overall
effect using a random effects model (two-stage inverse-variance model;
Stata package admetan and robumeta, where at the first stage we used
the experiment outcome, and at the second stage we used the id of a
given experiment), employing the method of Mantel and Haenszel
(1959). We assessed the influence of moderators using a random effects
metaregression assuming dependence among estimators (Stata package
robumeta). The frequency of moderators and the results of a mixed-
effects regression analysis are displayed in Tables 4 and 5. For modera-
tor variables, we reported p values of the comparison among effect
sizes under the levels of the moderator (in the case of moderators with
more than two levels, we compared the effect under a given level and
the average effect of the remaining levels). For each level of a given
moderator, we also reported the effect size and its associated p value.
There were two moderators that we treated as continuous variables:
sample size and anchor value (we analyzed the latter both as a continu-
ous variable and as a three-level categorical variable). In these cases,
we report mean, range, and regression coefficient and its associated p-
value. Furthermore, we provide forest plots for both the Control versus
Anchor and Low versus High Anchor groups (Figures 2 and 3).
Overall Effect (H1)
The overall effect size of anchoring on numeric legal decisions
for studies employing the Control vs. Anchor design according to
the RVE procedure was significant: z = .27, 95% CI [.21, .33], d =
.58, 95% CI [.44, .73], p , .001. For the High vs. Low Anchor,
the same test yielded the following statistically significant results:
z = .39, 95% CI [.31, .47], d = .91, 95% CI [.69, 1.12], p , .001.
Validation conducted by the classical meta-analytic procedure
with additional weights (accounting for the double-counting prob-
lem) supported these results (z = .26, d = .57, p , .001 in the Con-
trol vs. Anchor Condition and z = .41, d = 1.00, p , .001 in High
vs. Low condition). The homogeneity test statistic was significant
for both conditions at p , .001. Based on the analyzed studies, we
could conclude that the anchoring effect was present in both groups
of studies (Control vs. Anchor and High vs. Low Anchor).
The i2 heterogeneity measure, that is, the diversity between studies,
yielded the following results: for Anchor vs. Control, i2 = 56%, and for
High vs. Low Anchor, i2 = 68%. According to Higgins and colleagues
(2019) this might indicate moderate or substantial heterogeneity. This
level of heterogeneity should not however be considered surprising—
although all of the analyzed studies examined the same psychological
effect in the same area (legal decision-making), the diversity of
employed scenarios, types of anchors, target values, studied popula-
tions, and other peculiarities of the experimental design was substantial.
To investigate in-depth systematic differences between the primary
research included in the meta-analysis, we also conducted metaregres-
sion and subgroup analyses, as described below (see Tables 4 and 5).
Moderator Analysis
Because we analyzed almost all moderators using effect sizes from
both categories, the overall assessment of the moderator analysis
Table 4
Moderator Analysis for the Control Versus Anchor Design
Moderator P k Level z'
Effect sizes
CI [d] I2 bp [z'] CI [z’] d p [d]
Publication status .54 10 unpublished .33 .06a [.03, .68] .73 .09a [.19, 1.64] .57
46 published .25 ,.001 [.20, .30] .54 ,.001 [.42, .66]
Sample size .13 56 mean = 104, range = 30349 coef = .13 .13 [.30, .05] coef = .30 .16 [.75, .16] .53
Type of stimuli .73 17 short written .26 ,.001 [.19, .33] .55 ,.001 [.38, .72] .57
.05 29 rich written .20 ,.001 [.14, .27] .43 ,.001 [.28, .58] .52
.11 10 audio/video .46 .04a [.05, .86] 1.10 .06a [.12, 2.30] .43
Type of sample .30 42 lay .29 .29 [.20, .38] .64 ,.001 [.41, .86] .56
14 professional .23 ,.001 [.15, .31] .49 .001 [.30, .67]
Paradigm .99 42 basic .27 ,.001 [.19, .35] .58 ,.001 [.39, .77] .56
14 standard .27 .002a [.19, .35] .59 .003a [.37, .80]
Anchor value .36 4 low .21 .05a [.02, .40] .43 .05a [.01, .85] .57
.09 42 medium .28 ,.001 [.20, .35] .59 ,.001 [.43, .77] .54
.09 5 high .01 .07a [.04, .24] .19 .08a [.09, .49] .53
Anchor value .12a 51 mean = 2.45, range = .905.99 coef = .04 .12a [.11, .04] coef = .08 .13a [.26, .10] .54
Type of scale .21 34 open .25 ,.001 [.18, .33] .54 ,.001 [.36, .72] .56
22 closed .36 .002 [.21, .50] .79 .003 [.41, 1.17]
Relevance .40 12 irrelevant .24 .003 [.20, .36] .52 .003 [.42, .74] .58
.72 29 potentially relevant .27 ,.001 [.16, .37] .57 .001 [.32, .82] .59
.58 12 relevant .28 .002a [.18, .38] .59 .003a [.34, .84] .57
Type of anchor .01 18 ad damnum .37 ,.001 [.24, .50] .82 .001 [.48, 1.16] .46
.053 5 damage cap .43 .03a [.11, .74] .99 .04a [.11, 1.87] .55
.10 4 defendant’s counteroffer .12 .11a [.15, .39] .24 .11a [.30, .79] .52
.51 9 prosecutor's demand .24 .19a [.69, 1.17] .51 .21a [1.64, 2.65] .56
.09 20 other .21 ,.001 [.14, .27] .43 ,.001 [.28, .58] .54
Area of law .48a 43 civil .28 ,.001 [.21, .34] .60 ,.001 [.43, .76] .56
13 criminal .22 .15a [.45, .88] .46 .16a [1.05, 1.96]
Other salient values .05 47 mere anchor .29 ,.001 [.22, .36] .63 ,.001 [.46, .81] .55
8 counteranchor .20 .006a [.09, .30] .40 .007a [.18, .62]
a Degrees of freedom in small number could result in untrustworthy p values (Tanner-Smith & Tipton, 2014). b I2 statistic as estimated by meta-analysis
with additional weights. With RVE estimation stata package ‘robumeta’ were used, which does not enable direct I2 estimation.




















































































































should take into account whether a similar pattern of results occurred
for both groups of effect sizes. Because of the relatively small number
of effect sizes under any category, we assumed that the replication of
the same pattern would provide some evidence in favor of a given hy-
pothesis, even if statistical significance had been reached only under
one category (or even under none).
Methodological Moderators (H2–H3)
As for the type of stimuli, the analysis showed that only in the Con-
trol vs. Anchor design were there differences between effect sizes in
the levels of the moderator (under the High vs. Low design, the values
were almost the same across the levels). Although, contrary to our hy-
pothesis, the audio/video level yielded the largest effect size in the
Control vs. Anchor group, the effect size in the short written level was
larger than in the rich written level of the moderator, a result which
partially supported our hypothesis.
As for the hypothesis on the effect of sample type, the differen-
ces under both groups went in the predicted direction, with legal
professionals anchoring less, although the differences did not
reach statistical significance in either group. Thus, the evidence
favoring H3 was limited.
Psychological Moderators (H4–H7)
As for the paradigm moderator, there were no differences
between the effect sizes in the Control vs. Anchor design, and
the effect size under the standard paradigm in the High vs.
Low Anchor was noticeably larger than under the basic para-
digm, although the difference did not reach statistical signifi-
cance. Hence, the hypothesis predicting stronger anchoring
under the standard paradigm did not find any empirical
support.
We treated the moderator anchor value as both a categorical
and continuous variable to test H5. The analysis of this modera-
tor using the categorical design yielded the following results: In
both groups, anchors of medium value led to the largest effects
(although in neither group was this level’s effect size signifi-
cantly larger than average), thus providing some evidence in
favor of the hypothesis of the nonlinearity of the relation
between the anchor value and the effect size. When treating the
moderator as a continuous variable, the slope coefficient was
not significant in either group or, if anything, took a negative
value in both groups. This observation provides further support
to the hypothesis that the relation between anchor value and the
effect size is nonlinear, reaching its maximum for anchors of
moderate values.
The effect sizes with respect to the type of scale moderator were
as follows. Under the Control vs. Anchor design, the closed scale
level of the moderator presented a larger effect size than the open
scale level, contrary to our hypothesis. This situation was reversed
in the High vs. Low Anchor design, where the difference went in
the predicted direction, although it did not reach statistical signifi-
cance. Such conflicting evidence implies that H6 lacks empirical
support.
Table 5
Moderator Analysis for the High Versus Low Anchor Design
Moderator p k Level
Effect Sizes
CI [d] I2 bz' p [z'] CI [z’] d p [d]
Publication status .77 3 unpublished .37 .14a [.64, 1.37] .81 .16a [1.91, 3.53] .69
34 published .40 ,.001 [.31, .49] .92 ,.001 [.68, 1.16]
Sample size .07 37 mean = 7.2. range = 11173 coef = .002 .07 [.01, .01] coef = .005 .07 [.01, .01] .64
Type of stimuli .93a 10 short written .40 .40a [.10, .90] .95 .10a [.42, 2.32] .67
1.00 21 rich written .39 ,.001 [.29, .50] .91 ,.001 [.62, 1.20] .66
.92 6 audio/video .39 .02a [.12, .65] .87 .03a [.16, 1.57] .69
Type of sample .54 23 lay .41 ,.001 [.28, .51] .94 ,.001 [.59, 1.22] .67
14 professional .37 ,.001 [.27, .49] .84 ,.001 [.60, 1.16]
Paradigm .11 24 basic .35 ,.001 [.24, .45] .78 ,.001 [.50, 1.06] .67
13 standard .46 ,.001 [.38, .54] 1.06 ,.001 [.84, 1.29]
Anchor value .73 5 low .37 .02a [.14, .60] .82 .03a [.18, 1.45] .69
.11 25 medium .43 ,.001 [.34, .51] 1.00 ,.001 [.77, 1.23] .60
.15 7 high .33 .09a [.10, .77] .77 .13a [.42, 1.95] .59
Anchor value .90 37 mean = .24, range = .62 – .81 coef. = .02 .91a [2.32, 2.27] coef = .07 .89a [5.50, 5.35] .63
Type of scale .12 20 open .45 ,.001 [.32, .58] 1.07 ,.001 [.70, 1.45] .61
17 closed .34 ,.001 [.24, .44] .75 ,.001 [.50, 1.00]
Relevance .19 12 irrelevant .33 .002 [.18, .47] .72 .002 [.37, 1.06] .64
.08 24 potentially relevant .46 ,.001 [.35, .57] 1.08 ,.001 [.76, 1.40] .62
.40a 2 relevant .30 .23a [1.12, 1.72] .65 .25 [2.76, 4.06] .68
Type of anchor .12 16 ad damnum .50 ,.001 [.32, .67] 1.20 .002 [.65, 1.76] .51
.39 10 prosecutor's demand .35 .003a [.20, .50] .79 .005a [.40, 1.17] .65
.21 12 other .32 .001 [.21, .44] .71 .001 [.44, .98] .64
Area of law .31 21 civil .43 ,.001 [.30, .47] 1.00 ,.001 [.64, 1.36] .64
16 criminal .35 ,.001 [.24, .46] .79 ,.001 [.51, 1.07]
Other salient values .77 25 mere anchor .37 ,.001 [.26, .47] .84 ,.001 [.57, 1.12] .65
.38a 10 counteranchor .50 .02a [.17, .82] 1.18 .03a [.18, 2.18] .63
.24a 2 larger number .31 .05a [.03, .59] .66 .051a [.01, 1.33] .68
a Degrees of freedom in small number could result in untrustworthy p values (Tanner-Smith & Tipton, 2014). b I2 statistic as estimated by meta-analysis
with additional weights. With RVE estimation stata package ‘robumeta’ were used, which does not enable direct I2 estimation.





















































































































For the relevancemoderator, in theControl vs. Anchor design, the
trendwent exactly in the predicted direction, with irrelevant anchors
leading to the smallest effect, and the relevant anchors resulting in
the largest effects. The differences between levels, however, were
very small and did not reach significance. This pattern was partially
replicated under theHigh vs. Low design, where potentially relevant
anchors resulted in larger effects than irrelevant anchors. Surpris-
ingly, in this group, the relevant anchors led to the smallest effects,
although this resultwasnot reliable because of thevery small number
of effects included in this level. Thus, we obtained only limited evi-
dence in favor of the predicted role of relevance.
The number of levels of the moderator type of anchor varied
across designs, from five in the Control vs. Anchor to three in the
High vs. Low Anchor design. In the latter group the differences
between the levels and mean effect in others were not significant,
but the effect size in the ad damnum level was higher than in other
levels (even if the comparison was not statistically significant). In
the Control vs. Anchor design, the situation was more compli-
cated. The effect sizes in the ad damnum and damage cap levels
were higher than in the other levels. The difference between ad
damnum compared with the rest of the level was significant, and
the difference in the damage cap condition is noticeable although
not significant. The differences for the other levels were not signif-
icant and only the effect size in the level other was statistically sig-
nificant. One should note the small number of studies in the
counteroffer and prosecutor’s demand levels of this moderator. To
sum up, the results only partially corroborate H8, as the effect
sizes resulting from ad damnum and damage caps were
Figure 2
Effect Sizes for Control Versus Anchor Design




















































































































consistently larger. We did not corroborate the part of the hypothe-
sis concerning the prosecutor’s demand, but this could have been
the result of the limited number of studies in which this level of
moderator was present.
As for the area of law to which the studies were referring (H9),
the effect in civil cases was larger than in the criminal level for
both designs (consistent with our hypothesis) even if the differen-
ces were not significant. Thus, we obtained some limited evidence
in favor of the hypothesis in question.
The last hypothesis dealt with the number of salient values pres-
ent in the decision context (H10). In the Control vs. Anchor group,
we located only studies qualifying for two levels of the moderator:
Mere anchor and Counteranchor with the difference between the
two levels significant, and the trend in the size of the effects going
in the predicted direction. In the High vs. Low Anchor design, the
effect size was the largest in the case when the counteranchor was
present, and smallest when multiple other salient values were pres-
ent. However, differences between the levels of the moderator
were insignificant. We should emphasize that the number of stud-
ies in both categories in which at least one anchor was present was
very low, thus affecting the reliability of the analysis. In the
Control vs. Anchor design, the statistically significant difference
between Mere anchor and Counteranchor supports H10, but the
situation in the High vs. Low Anchor design, in which the effect
size in one counteranchor level was the largest, does not support
this hypothesis.
Publication Bias
The trim-and-fill method (Duval & Tweedie, 2000) indicated
the presence of significant publication bias (we validated the
results via Egger’s Test for small-study effects), both in the Con-
trol vs. Anchor and High vs. Low Anchor designs. In the Control
vs. Anchor design, the trim-and-fill method suggested 14 addi-
tional effect sizes missing due to bias. The overall mean effect size
was thus overestimated and had to be corrected to z = .19 (p ,
.001; 95% CI [.15, .24]) compared with z = .27, whereas in the
classical meta-analysis the correction for Cohen’s d equaled .40 (p
, .001; 95% CI [.29, .52]). In the High vs. Low Anchor design,
the diagnosis revealed as well the 14 filled effect sizes and the cor-
rection of z from its original value of .39 to .29 (p , .001; 95% CI
[.21, .37]) and Cohen’s d to .62 (p , .001; 95% CI [.40, .84]).
Figure 3
Effect Sizes for High Versus Low Anchor Design




















































































































Filled funnel plots for both designs are shown in Figure 4. Addi-
tionally, the effect of the moderator sample size went in the direc-
tion indicating the presence of publication bias (with larger effect
sizes obtained with smaller samples), although this result turned
out to be insignificant for both groups.
Discussion
Overall Effect
The overarching goal of this analysis was to examine whether
the experimental research corroborated the thesis that salient
numeric values present in the decision context affect numeric out-
comes of legal proceedings. Our results indeed supported this the-
sis with solid evidence. Despite the necessity to split analyzed
effect sizes into two groups—mostly because of fundamental ex-
perimental design differences—we found significant overall effect
sizes of anchor presence in both groups.
Because the estimates of the average anchoring effect pre-
sented in the article may be biased as a result of the presence of a
publication bias, we are inclined to interpret our results with cau-
tion (although one should also remember that estimation of pub-
lication bias itself may be problematic, because none of the
detection methods test “directly” for publication bias [Renkewitz
& Keiner, 2019] and they perform poorly when true effect sizes
were heterogeneous, which is the norm rather than the exception
[McShane et al., 2019]). Thus, we want our study to be treated
not as concluding the investigations on legal anchoring but rather
as inspiring further research in the field. Subsequent studies
should focus on replication of existing primary studies both to
Figure 4
Funnel Plots for Control Versus Anchor (Up) and High Versus Low Anchor
(Down) Design
Note. s. e. = standard error.




















































































































verify the extent to which currently available data are skewed by
the publication bias and to examine the sources of noticeable
heterogeneity.
It is hard to assess how the overall effect sizes obtained in this
analysis compare with the effect of anchoring in other contexts,
because this is one of the first meta-analyses of research on anchoring
in general. We cannot reliably compare our results with those from
the meta-analysis on anchoring in negotiations (Orr & Guthrie, 2006)
because of methodological divergences. In that meta-analysis, the
researchers managed to treat anchor value as a continuous variable,
which most likely made their overall effect size larger than it would
have been under our approach. In our case, the Pearson r correlation
coefficient for the High versus Low group (which can be compared
with the studies on negotiations, where no control group was
employed) was .38, making it lower than the result reported by Orr
and Guthrie (2006; r = .5). Nevertheless, according to the general
rules of thumb for interpreting the magnitude of effect size (Cohen,
1988; Sawilowsky, 2009), we can consider the obtained effect sizes
as medium (Control vs. Anchor) and large (High vs. Low).
The necessity to split effect sizes into two groups was, on the
one hand, a limitation of the current study because the limited
number of studies in both groups restricted our ability to make
more solid inferences. On the other hand, it allowed us to compare
overall effect sizes under the two study designs. This was impor-
tant because these two different types of design were not the result
of research convenience but rather represent a more fundamental
theoretical dispute (Englich et al., 2006). For all the measures that
we employed, the overall effect size for the High vs. Low group
was noticeably larger than the value under the Control vs. Anchor
design (although there is a small overlap between the respective
confidence intervals). This is certainly a result that can contribute
to resolving that dispute. Despite the fact that the interpretation of
this outcome depends on one’s theoretical preconceptions, we
might assume that it stemmed from the fact that the participants in
the control group were still under the influence of some (poten-
tially self-generated) anchors that increased the variability of tar-
get value assessments in that group, thus decreasing the observed
overall effect size (Englich et al., 2006).
Type of Stimulus
Whereas in the High vs. Low design the estimates for all three lev-
els of the moderator were almost equal, the differences for the Con-
trol vs. Anchor Group seem large enough to deserve a mention. In
the latter case, as predicted, we found that short vignettes were some-
what better at isolating the effect of anchoring than longer written
materials, but they might have done that at the cost of decreased eco-
logical validity. What is interesting, contrary to our hypothesis, we
observed a noticeably, although not significant, larger effect with
audio/video materials. One could argue that perception of images
causes increased attention and thus better acquisition of information,
thus making the anchor more salient and easier to recall.
Type of Sample
Contrary to H3, we did not observe significant differences
between lay and professional samples. This implies that concerns
about making generalizations from one population to another
might not be justified. We noted, however, a uniform trend under
both analyzed groups of studies, with professional samples anchor-
ing a bit less than lay ones. This result tracks an analogical trend
observed in the meta-analysis on anchoring in negotiations (Orr &
Guthrie, 2006). It may be the case that expertise insulates from
some factors that reinforce the effect size of anchoring in the gen-
eral sample (For instance, experts could be less influenced by their
mood, see Englich & Soder, 2009. This conjecture would be con-
sistent with the predictions of the elaboration-based model, see
Wegener, 2010b.). We thus conclude that anchoring is a universal
phenomenon, prevalent in different populations, yet further
research on the moderating effect of legal expertise is warranted.
Paradigm
According to the assumption associated with the selective
accessibility model, studies employing the standard paradigm
should lead to larger effects than those obtained in the basic para-
digm (Englich, 2008). However, our analysis showed that only in
the High vs. Low Anchor group the difference went in the pre-
dicted direction, and even there it was not significant. The null
result in the Control vs. Anchor group possibly suggests that either
the issue at hand might be more complicated (meaning that
another factor could be at play here) or that the shallow aspect of
anchoring could perhaps explain the result, which would open the
debate on the role of conscious and subconscious processing of
anchors.
Anchor Value
Although moderate anchors led, as predicted, to the largest
effect sizes (even if the result was not significant), high anchors
produced effects smaller than the medium or low anchors. More-
over, treating the anchor value as a continuous variable failed to
establish significant results. This, to some extent, contradicts the
predictions of the selective accessibility model (Strack & Muss-
weiler, 1997). On the other hand, the present findings might find
theoretical explanation in the elaboration-based account (Wegener
et al., 2010b). One possible mechanism that might facilitate this
effect is the role of plausibility of the anchor which is directly
employed as a factor mitigating the effect in an elaboration-based
account of anchoring. This issue clearly needs further research as
one might test different levels of extremity of the anchors and per-
ceived plausibility of the anchors as factors mitigating the magni-
tude of the effect.
Type of Scale
We hypothesized that, in accordance with scale distortion
theory, the effect sizes would be smaller when the target value was
assessed on a bound scale. Our highly inconclusive results in this
case mean that this study does not provide further evidence in
favor of this theory. Moreover, the fact that the overall effect sizes
of anchoring for bound scales (in both groups) are significant
means that it is not the open character of some scales used in law
that is the primary reason behind the omnipresence of the anchor-
ing effect in legal contexts and merely setting statutory boundaries
(such as caps) would not insulate the decision-maker from the
undesirable influence of an anchor.




















































































































Overall, the analysis of the psychological moderators confirmed
our earlier conjecture that forming a unified theory of the anchor-
ing effect may be problematic, as different points of analysis might
support competing theories. Thus far, in most of the cases, the
selective accessibility model supplemented by the elaboration-
based model might account for the effect in question, but none of
the studies of anchoring in legal settings explicitly employed a
design based on scale distortion theory, so that conclusion may be
premature.
Relevance
The current analysis offers very limited evidence in favor of the
thesis that relevant anchors result in stronger effects. We still find
this pattern of results important because it points out that, in line
with some models of numeric judgment in law (Hans & Reyna,
2011), anchoring in legal contexts can have some desirable fea-
tures. On the other hand, the fact that the overall effect sizes for
irrelevant anchors remain significant corroborates the thesis that
even absolutely immaterial numeric values can influence the out-
come of legal proceedings (Englich et al., 2006). However,
because differences between levels of this moderator were rather
small and mostly failed to reach statistical significance, the cate-
gory of relevance should be subject for further studies.
Presence of Other Salient Values
The results are inconclusive, mostly because of a small number of
studies employing more than one anchor. This points out the impor-
tant theoretical question that has been thus far rather neglected in the
literature. Despite the fact that both theoretical models of anchoring
and numerical decision-making in law describe the process of utiliz-
ing the anchor to get a target value, they devote little attention to the
process of anchor selection. In a typical study, only one or two num-
bers appear as viable anchors. This may be not the case in real-life
decision-making, when a plethora of numbers may be equally salient
(see the study by Hastie et al., 1999, which analyzes how study par-
ticipants can choose between different potential anchors).
Type of Anchor, Area of Law
In line with the arguments raised in the literature, our study
highlights the importance of ad damnum. The opportunity to start
with a numeric demand gives the plaintiff a clear first-move
advantage. Furthermore, our results corroborate the concern that
damage caps do not insulate from anchoring, as they are itself a
potent anchor. Noticeably smaller effect sizes resulting from pros-
ecutor’s demand suggest that such a first-mover advantage is less
of an issue in criminal law, although the pattern of results for the
moderator area of law clearly shows that, in general, anchoring
influences decisions in the criminal law context as well.
Limitations
Despite the importance of conclusions drawn from the present
research, some limitations should be noted. The main factor that
might influence the conclusions drawn is that we were forced to
split the studies into two main groups, in accordance with the
employed design. Although under both groups we obtained
significant overall effect sizes, this procedure also diminished the
number of studies in some of the moderator levels and resulted in
a lower power of statistical analysis (limiting our ability to draw
valid inferences regarding our hypotheses). What is more, in some
cases, the pattern of results of the moderator analysis under the
two designs went in the opposite directions making it impossible
to reach univocal conclusions.
Moreover, because of the necessity of using the two design cate-
gories and because of the limited number of studies, some of the
potentially important variables could not be treated separately and
had to be included in one category. For instance, the moderator
relevance was less fine-grained than we had hoped, ignoring, for
example, the distinctive nature of formally inadmissible anchors
(Wistrich et al., 2005) and the differences between meaningful and
meaningless anchors (Hans et al., 2018). This potentially limits
the depth of the conclusions offered and introduces a certain need
for further studies.
Also, we faced a difficulty similar to that of other meta-analy-
ses: We did not manage to get to all unpublished studies. Despite
that we used methods for correcting this bias, one should be aware
that the adjusted estimates are approximate. We had to deal with a
lack of important data in published articles that were essential for
overall effect estimation and its evaluation. However, we believe
that the presented results will be the starting point for further dis-
cussion, and effect estimates will be updated with new research in
subsequent meta-analyses, allowing us to dispel the doubts
expressed in our article.
Implications for Researchers and Legal Professionals
It is of utmost importance that numerical legal rulings are issued
in a biased and unpredictable way. The existing literature has sug-
gested that the prevalence of the anchoring effect in legal contexts
might be a major obstacle for achieving those goals (although one
should remember that some anchors might have a positive role in
legal decision-making; Helm et al., 2020). This synthesis of the
experimental research provides further evidence suggesting the
robustness of this effect in legal contexts. The effect of anchoring
remains significant independently of the employed research design
or branch of law used to construct stimuli. Its relative strength
derives from its meaning, as some anchors are more potent than
others—especially the initial demand of the party, which reveals a
troubling effect from the viewpoint of the fairness of the
proceedings.
The results of the moderator analysis point to some potential
directions of further research. One example is the effect of the
anchor’s relevance to the case to be decided: It remains a much
understudied topic (Glöckner & Englich, 2015; Hans et al., 2018;
and Reyna et al., 2015 seem to be the only studies in the field to
directly manipulate this variable), whereas the present study
clearly indicates it has an impact on the effect size. Assessing the
impact of relevance could also help to elucidate anchoring mecha-
nisms in situations in which more salient values are present. For
example, in a study by Hastie et al. (1999), in posttrial question-
naires, a number of participants admitted using anchoring and
adjustment as a conscious strategy, arbitrarily choosing some of
the numbers present in a defendant’s financial statement as a basis
for their calculations. Our review showed the scarcity of studies
dealing with such issues as the effect of the inadmissibility of the




















































































































values that are materially relevant and meaningful. If the saliency
of the anchor plays a role here, exclusionary rules may increase it.
The categories of inadmissibility and meaningfulness and their
combinations may be only a germ for future studies, and the cur-
rent results possibly justify the hope for an outcome that would be
less worrying from the legal viewpoint.
Another example of a moderator worth further research is the
susceptibility of professional legal decision-makers to anchoring.
The common wisdom in the field is that they do not perform sig-
nificantly better than laypeople (e.g., Englich & Mussweiler,
2001; Englich & Soder, 2009, comparing professional judges and
students subject to the same experiment). This study, however,
found slight and insignificant, but nonetheless consistent, results
pointing to professionals’ smaller susceptibility to anchoring, thus
indicating there might be more to this story and that further
research directly comparing legal professionals and laypeople
would be worthwhile. A wholly new direction of research would
be comparing the relative strength of anchoring in different
branches of law, and this meta-analysis provides a good reason to
believe that the effect might operate differently in different legal
contexts. Last but not least, an important methodological issue
arises from the present synthesis: the substantial effect of the
method by which participants are familiarized with the case. To
account for the pattern of results described here and to decide
which experimental setting leads to a greater ecological validity is
not only crucial to research on anchoring in the courtroom but
could also prove important to experimental research on legal deci-
sion-making in general, as well as shedding some light on the cog-
nitive basis of anchoring mechanisms.
Strikingly, in the present study we did not analyze the potentially
moderating effect of employing some debiasing techniques, such as
Larrick’s (2004) cognitive (training in biases, training in representa-
tions, etc.) or motivational (accountability, etc.) strategies. Such anal-
ysis would be worthwhile, especially because there are at least two
methods of debiasing anchoring whose effectiveness in legal contexts
has found some corroboration: making individuals aware of existence
and potential influence of anchoring (an example of training in
biases; Stein & Drouin, 2018); and making them aware of their
accountability for assessing the target value accurately (Guthrie et al.,
2009; on the effect of accountability, see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).
Another potential debiasing measure (that could be classified as a
case of training in representations) employed in the studies was
changing the format of the anchor. In legal settings, this might be
achieved by comparing anchors in the form of lump sum and per
diem (Campbell et al., 2017; McAuliff & Bornstein, 2010). However,
because of the small number of studies employing any of these
debiasing measures, we were forced not to engage with this topic in
the moderator analysis. Nevertheless, this suggests the urgent need
for further research in this area, as effective debiasing techniques
could prove invaluable in legal settings.
When it comes to implications for legal practice, the crucial
issue is whether the parties should set their demands as high as
possible. It seems that the dependence between the anchor value
and effect size has its maximum, so the absurdly high anchors
may not work as intended. However, even if the strength of the
effect is somewhat diminished when an anchor is set very high,
the assimilation persists. Therefore, setting the demand amount
high (but not absurdly high) provides a solid advantage for the
party initiating the proceedings. Despite the fact that, in the crimi-
nal context the effects are somewhat weaker than in civil proceed-
ings, the pattern is similar. Can the defendant effectively respond
by setting a counteranchor? Counteranchors appear to work to
some extent, yet seem unable to substantially diminish the effect
of the main anchor. It appears that the right to the first move favors
the party initiating the proceedings.
Another consideration concerns whether the lawmakers can bal-
ance the scales, proving a level playing field for both parties to
legal proceedings. The typical tool used to achieve this is to intro-
duce damage caps. Our analysis corroborated the thesis that caps
themselves work as anchors and, therefore, might work in a different
way than intended (potentially lifting the damage amount instead of
lowering it). On the other hand, debiasing methods seemed to limit
the effect, but the data on their usage remain scarce, and it would be
premature to base the policy on this assumption. Some more struc-
tural solutions to address this problem may be applicable. For
instance, a promising proposition would be to provide the decision-
maker with some values that would serve as meaningful and relevant
anchors—such as the mean amount of damages awarded in a given
type of case (Saks et al., 1997). The potential positive role of some
kinds of anchors was recently underlined by Helm and colleagues
(2020). As shown by our synthesis, multiple salient numbers present
in the decision context seem to limit the anchoring.
Despite decades of research on anchoring in legal decision-mak-
ing, a number of important issues remain unsolved, as we still do not
haveasinglepsychological theoryencompassingall thecomplexities
of this phenomenon. The most important directions for future
research are related to the role which numbers play in the decision-
making context: Which numbers serve as anchors in decision-mak-
ing? andWhat is the role of the saliency of the number, and howdoes
it drive the effect?After solvingmore theoretical controversies about
the cognitive basis of the effect, methods of debiasing should be
developed, as limiting the role of irrelevant or biased anchors is cru-
cial toguarantee the fairnessof legalproceedings.
Conclusion
The anchoring effect in legal decision-making seems to be a ro-
bust effect, as we estimated large and significant overall effect sizes
even after having to split analyzed studies into two separate groups
on methodological grounds. However, we also obtained evidence
suggesting that research in this area might suffer from a publication
bias, which hints that more further studies are needed before we
can declare that legal anchoring is indeed a robust phenomenon.
Although our moderator analysis largely did not yield significant
results, the obtained pattern of results indicates the possible moder-
ating effect of some legally important factors (such as legal exper-
tise, the relevance of the anchor, or the anchor value), which will
hopefully also lead to further research in this area. Moreover, the
results of our analysis provide grounds for criticizing the two domi-
nating theories of anchoring: scale distortion theory (i.e., because
providing participants with a bound scale did not lead to decreased
effect size) and selective accessibility model (e.g., studies using the
standard paradigm did not lead to larger effect sizes).
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Daftary-Kapur and Berry (2010) missing data (unable to contact the authors)
Ebbesen and Konecni (1975) missing data (author contacted but unable to provide missing data)
Ellis (2002) missing data (author contacted but unable to provide missing data)
Englich and Soder (2009) missing data (author contacted but unable to provide missing data)
Greene et al. (1999) presence of an entire expert opinion as a manipulation
Marti (2000) missing data (author contacted but unable to provide missing data)
Marti and Wissler (2000) missing data (author contacted but unable to provide missing data)
Raitz et al. (1990) presence of an entire expert opinion as a manipulation
Saks et al. (1997) awards variability as the dependent variable
Schmitz (2007) missing data (unable to contact the author)
Viscusi (2001) missing data (author contacted but unable to provide missing data)
Zuehl (1982) missing manuscript
Appendix B
Statistical Formulas
Formula used to recount Mann Whitney test statistic: r ¼ Zffiffiffi
N
p
Fisher’s z transformation: z ¼ :5 ln 1þ rð Þ  ln 1 rð Þ
 
Standard error of the distribution of z statistic: se0z ¼ 1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiN3p





Cohen’s d: d ¼ M1M2ð ÞSDPOOLED









þ d22 N1þN2ð Þ
q
95% CI for Cohen’s d: d  1:963s dð Þ, d þ 1:963s dð Þ½ 
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